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 An Identity Aware WiMax Personalization for Pervasive Computing Services 
Abstract— Mobile Internet access is becoming more and more 
pervasive in the new 4G scenarios, where WiMAX is to play a 
crucial role. WiMax has advantages when considering both 
energy consumption and bandwidth, when compared with 
HSDPA and LTE. However, we have found some limitations in 
IEEE 802.16 security support, which may limit authentication 
and authorization mechanisms for ubiquitous service 
development. In this article we analyze weaknesses and 
vulnerabilities we have found in WiMAX security. WiMax, 
with the adequate identity management support, could be 
invaluable for developing new pervasive computing services. 
We propose the introduction of identity management in 
WiMAX, as a pervious step to the definition of identity aware 
WiMax personalization of pervasive computing services.1 
 
Index Terms—WiMAX; IEEE 802.16; Security; Identity 
Management; authentication; personalization. 
I. INTRODUCTION  
Mobile internet access popularity is increasing with new 
network technologies, more powerful terminals, and the 
progressive reduction of tariffs. Mobile internet access has 
deep implications in pervasive system design and 
personalization. The lessons learned are still valid: design for 
worst case uneven conditioning environments, zero 
configuration and autonomous system, or exploit cooperation 
for scalability among others. We should benefit from 
improving network quality and availability, and require 
adequate support from newer and upcoming network 
technologies. Adequacy in the sense of ease of integration, 
and more specifically in invisibility, since human attention 
keeps the most limiting factor in the whole system. 
Architectures are progressively moving towards Service 
Oriented Architectures (SOA), and even to Software as a 
service (SAAS), like in cloud computing. This movement 
brings more importance to security aspects of service com-
position, and user privacy, like in Identity management and 
established trust relations among the entities of a composite 
services. They help us minimizing the number of times a 
user has to be distracted in order to authenticate with the 
different entities involved in the service. 
The importance of WiMAX (Worldwide Interoperability 
for Microwave Access) is growing quickly and is expected to 
play a key role in 4th generation communication. Besides, 
recent works like [1] show advantages in power consumption 
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for WiMax over LTE (Long Term Evolution) and HSDPA. 
In this context, security support is a fundamental aspect to be 
addressed in order to protect users’ information as well as 
corporate networks. WiMax has been in constant revision to 
address those problems. Several amendments to the IEEE 
802.16 standard, as 802.16d [2] and 802.16e [3] that define 
security mechanisms for fixed and mobile networks, have 
been proposed in the past few years. The most recent one, 
from March 2011, is IEEE 802.16m [4] that is part of the 
Wireless MAN-Advanced or WiMAX2-defined profiles. 
IEEE 802.16m provides performance improvements needed 
to support advanced services and applications for the next 
generation broadband focusing on mobile applications. 
Concerning security, the IEEE 802.16d standard security 
architecture was based on the PKMv1 (Privacy Key 
Management) protocol that had many security problems, 
such as Man-in-the-Middle and replay attacks. Later versions 
of PKMv2 and PKMv3 protocols, used in IEEE 802.16e and 
IEEE 802.16m respectively, try to address these problems. 
The Privacy Key Management protocol offers solutions that 
enable device and user authentication between a mobile 
station (MS) and the base station (BS) or the home 
connectivity service network (CSN). In IEEE 802.16, 
security has been considered as one of the main objectives of 
the protocol. However, some security mechanisms of EEE 
802.16 still have certain threats and risks [5], as how to 
address security and privacy of user information in an inter-
domain scenario, or how to manage identity among different 
operators. These problems should be addressed to bring 
access to services in a secure fashion. 
Personalization is key to enhance user experience and 
this has been signalled since the first proposals of ubiquitous 
computing. Personalization also leads to reduced complexity 
of management tasks for average users. To achieve this sort 
of personalization it would be necessary to identify users and 
exchange their profiles in a secure fashion respecting users’ 
privacy. WiMAX allows the use of X.509 digital certificates 
together with RSA encryption or Extensible Authentication 
Protocol (EAP) [6] to perform user authentication and access 
control. However, nowadays this technology is not able to 
provide an adequate degree of flexibility to bring a better 
user experience by its own. Therefore, new paradigms need 
to be defined in order to make WiMAX a suitable 
technology for accessing multiple domain services in a user 
centric, dynamic, and secure manner. According to that, 
Identity Management (IdM) Systems reveal as an 
indispensable vehicle to provide a seamless, secure, and 
personalized user experience within 4G services. To overcome 
those limitations, we propose the use of an IdM System based 
on infoCards and SAML along with the WiMAX architecture to 
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 enable a user centric identity framework for secure and 
personalized services in a wireless scenario. 
The rest of this paper is structured as follows: section II 
provides a brief background on security WiMAX identifying the 
challenges to be faced. Section III reviews the current identity 
management frameworks that lay the foundations of our work. 
Section IV analyzes requirements for identity management and 
provides a novel architecture to enhance digital identity 
management in WiMAX. Then, Section V describes some 
potential use cases. Open issues and related works regarding 
security in WiMAX are illustrated in section VI. Finally, section 
VII summarizes the work and presents the conclusions and 
future lines. 
II. WIMAX SECURITY 
 
WiMAX architecture is composed of two main layers: 
the Medium Access Control (MAC) layer and physical 
(PHY) layer. The MAC layer is responsible for managing 
connections and security, whereas the physical layer is in 
charge of handling signal connectivity, error connection, etc. 
Regarding security, the 802.16 standard specifies a security 
sublayer at the bottom of the MAC layer. This security 
sublayer provides Subscriber Station (SS) (or Mobile Station 
(MS)) with authentication and privacy services. It also 
protects Base Stations (BS) from unauthorized network 
access and service hijacking. In addition, there are two 
component protocols in the security sublayer: an 
encapsulation protocol for encrypting packet payloads across 
the fixed broadband wireless access (BWA) systems, and a 
Privacy Key Management Protocol (PKM) that provides 
secure distribution of keying material from BS to SS, as well 
as, enables BS to enforce conditional access to network 
services. The reminder of the section describes the WiMAX 
security architecture and the main concepts on which it is 
based. 
The security architecture [7] of WiMAX is divided in 
three logical entities that perform security management, 
encryption, and integrity. The security management 
functions include overall security management and control, 
security association management, location privacy, EAP 
encapsulation and de-encapsulation and PKM control. The 
latter controls security components such as key derivation, 
update or usage. The encryption and integrity functions are 
in charge of dealing with confidentiality and authentication. 
These functions include message authentication and message 
confidentiality as well as user data encryption and 
authentication. Fig. 1 shows the functional blocks of the 
latest IEEE 802.16 (IEEE 802.16m) security architecture. 
1) Privacy Key Management (PKM): The WiMAX 
standard uses an underlying trust model based on Public Key 
Infrastructure (PKI) to carry out the exchange of 
cryptographic material between the mobile station (MS) and 
the base station others, on the context in which the 
information is used. Several variants of the PKM protocol 
have been proposed aiming at covering security issues not 
addressed in the previous versions. This section gives a brief 
overview of each variant and discusses their deficiencies and 
vulnerabilities. First, the IEEE 802.16d standard security was 
based on PKMv1 [8] which required the SS to authenticate 
to the BS but not the other way around leading to potential 
Man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks.  
 
Fig. 1. Functional blocks of the IEEE 802.16m security architecture. 
Furthermore, this protocol was vulnerable to replay 
attacks and did not support integrity protection of 
management frames, exhibiting a risk of denial-of-service 
(DoS) attacks. In order to counter these security issues, 
PKMv2 was proposed and adopted by the IEEE 802.16e 
standard, which revised the original authorization protocol to 
provide mutual authentication, introduced an additional 
message to provide SS acknowledgment and required three-
way authentication based on X.509. Therefore, both the SS 
and the network entities, that are the BS and the access 
service network-gateway (ASN-GW), are, in this version, 
required to authorize and authenticate each other. Moreover, 
PKMv2 protocol supports the use of RSA to perform key 
cryptography exchange, which requires the mobile stations 
to identify themselves using either a manufacture-issued 
X.509 certificate or an operator issued credential, such as a 
subscriber identity module (SIM) card. Regarding the digital 
certificate it should contain the mobile station public key and 
its MAC address. This kind of certificates allows to validate 
user’s identity on the WiMax network. 
After a successful authentication, the mobile terminal 
negotiates with the serving BS a cryptographic suite for each 
provisioned service flow. However, this enhanced version is 
still vulnerable to an intervalling attack, in which an attacker 
impersonates a legitimate SS [9]. Finally, in IEEE 802.16m a 
new protocol called PKMv3 is proposed, which adds an 
extensible framework for previous PKM supporting key 
agreement in multi hop relay for broadband wireless access. 
However, this version does not consider dynamic multi-hop 
connection between BSs and Relay Stations (RSs), and 
cannot defend the network against some security attacks as 
IP spoofing. Some proposals which may help to address this 
problem can be found in section IV. 
 
2) Authentication and Authorization: In few words, 
authentication is a mechanism to determine that a user 
sending a message is really who he claims to be. 
Authorization is the process responsible for assigning 
privileges to users that would govern the access control that 
would determine what services or resources a user may 
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 access. These processes typically involve three kinds of 
entities: 1) a client or supplicant, which resides in the mobile 
station; 2) an authenticator, which can reside in the base 
station or in a gateway; and 3) an authentication server. 
WiMAX allows the use of X.509 digital certificates 
together with RSA encryption or Extensible Authentication 
Protocol (EAP) to perform user authentication and access 
control. However, enforcing security and privacy in inter-
domain scenarios or managing users among different 
operators are security topics that need to be addressed in 
order to deliver services in a secure fashion regardless the 
administrative domain. IdM systems have become 
indispensable to provide a seamless and secure user 
experience when dealing with high distributed services 
provided through different networks as in 4G scenarios. 
Furthermore, IdM infrastructures reduce the complexity of 
service deployment and maintenance in wireless 
environments, such as WiMAX, where network operators 
need to integrate mobile and fixed telephony together with 
Internet and business services that might belong to different 
trust domains. Finally, user personalization is one of the 
most outstanding topics in service provision requiring 
security and privacy. 
IdM provides mechanisms like Single Sign On (SSO), 
which allows users to authenticate once when accessing 
several services, to obtain personalized contents or services 
without providing any additional information. This sort of 
user management is adequate for providing tailored services 
to users that might require cooperation of the access network 
provider, for instance, for assigning different QoS according 
to their preferences and needs. Moreover, IdM systems deal 
with privacy by controlling which attributes are disclosed to 
each service. 
Since new mobile devices with increased capabilities 
allow users to access services everywhere, giving complete 
freedom to the end user it is necessary to manage user 
preferences, security, privacy and personalization as a whole 
involving services and providers. Unfortunately, WiMAX is 
not currently able to give this improved experience to users. 
Therefore, new paradigms, as the one we are proposing in 
this article must be defined in order to make WiMAX a 
suitable technology for accessing multiple domain services 
in a user centric, dynamic and secure manner. 
III.  IDENTITY MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORKS 
 
There are several disjoint approaches to Digital Identity: 
user-centric, federated, or corporate. However, the actors in 
an identity management scenario can be classified as 
follows:  
• The Principal, or end user, who has a particular 
digital identity. He interacts (usually via an user 
agent, typically a web browser), with a Service 
Provider.  
• Service Provider (SP), which provides services and 
takes decisions based on the information that is 
provided by a third party about a particular subject. 
SPs are sometimes called Relying Parties.  
• Identity Provider (IdP), which focuses on enforcing 
authentication and managing the identity 
information, which can be shared with various SPs.  
Identity Management is available in several flavours; 
there are formal standards, open source technologies or 
openly published specifications covering different 
approaches. However, the most prominent effort towards a 
formal definition has been bought by SAML [10] that 
defines a security assertion language over which IdM 
technology can be built. SAML is tightly coupled to several 
federated identity or user-centric identity specifications and 
implementations, like the Liberty Alliance Identity 
Federation Framework [11], WS-Federation [12] or 
Shibboleth [13]. InfoCards [14] is the most outstanding user-
centric identity approach. InfoCards, with the aid of SAML, 
defines a framework to proffer users full control over their 
identity information, as well as, their authentication 
mechanisms. Our proposal combines the benefits of SAML 
and InfoCards technologies for better identity management 
in WiMAX networks. 
 
1) Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML): defines 
an XML based framework that allows to express assertions 
about an identity, including attributes, authorization and/or 
authentication information of a subject with the aim to 
facilitate relations between different security domains their 
users. This specification defines four key elements: 
Assertions, which carry statements about a Principal as 
asserted by an IdP and can be related to authentication, 
attribute exchange or authorization; Protocols, which 
describe the sequence of request-response messages 
governing the exchange of Assertions; Bindings, which 
define how SAML Assertions and request-response protocol 
messages can be exchanged between entities using a given 
underlying communication protocols (such as HTTP, 
Diameter, SIP, etc.); and Profiles, which define the specific 
sequence of messages and the Bindings required in each case 
to complete the use cases defined in the standard. Variations 
of the same profile can be obtained for each combination of 
use case and Binding. Finally, note that SAML is highly 
flexible, which allows all its components can be extended. 
2) Information Cards: Infocards constitute the digital 
metaphor of the cards we carry every day in our wallets (e.g. 
credit cards, id card, driving license) and we use in 
transactions in our daily live. The same concept or metaphor 
can be extended to the wallet itself, so, as we have digital 
cards, we also have “digital wallets” or, in terms or user-
centric nomenclature, Identity Selectors. 
Identity selectors allow users to manage their cards 
selecting the most appropriate credential as when we show 
our driving license to a police officer or the library card to 
the clerk and not the other way around. So the user decides 
when to submit, what, and to whom. As we have mentioned 
before, InfoCards is a user-centric identity technology that 
allows users to select among their multiple identities inside 
their identity portfolio to identify themselves to services. 
Thus, users can manage in a comprehensive way their 
different electronic identities mimicking the real life. It 
brings more transparency, though the SP may obscure its 
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 purposes, or use different identities, making difficult to the 
user to understand what and why are required. 
Regarding identity selectors, in [15] two types of 
InfoCards are specified: Personal or Self-Issued (claims 
about the user itself, e.g. phone number, e-mail address, web 
address); and a Managed Information Cards, issued by 
Identity Providers. The latter can be auditing, non-auditing, 
or auditing-optional to accommodate the needs of different 
business models. There are several implementations of this 
concept as Windows CardSpace [16], Higgins project [17], 
Open Source Identity Selector [18] or Bandit [19]. 
 
In addition, InfoCards support several data formats and 
authentication methods such as XML, SAML, and OpenID. 
InfoCard-based identity management systems typically use 
Web Services Security protocols (WS-*) and SOAP. WS-
Trust [20] is preferred protocol to obtain and exchange 
security tokens. Moreover, the integrity of the tokens is 
preserved using an XML-Signature that is part of the WS-
Security [21] protocol. 
IV. IDM ARCHITECTURE FOR SECURE 
PERSONALIZED SERVICE PROVISION OVER WIMAX 
A. Objectives and Requirements 
Our proposal pursues to overcome the limitations of 
current user management in WiMAX: providing an identity 
framework that copes with the needs of the different actors 
as users, network operators, roaming networks and 
application service providers, maintaining a high security 
degree, and achieving a better personalization. The 
objectives can be summarized in: 
 
• Comprehensive identity management: allows users 
to safely manage their own identity information, 
such as changing passwords, subscription status, the 
choice of opting for mobility, changing roaming 
authorization, modifying user profiles. 
• Basic security primitives: provides privacy, 
confidentiality, integrity, authenticity.  
• Seamless interaction among entities: Our 
architecture enables interaction with third party 
applications, as well as, secure exchange of 
authentication credentials and personal profiles with 
the visited network operator and application service 
providers, to deliver secure and per-sonalized 
services in a transparent manner even during 
roaming.  
• Simple configuration: our solution minimizes 
configuration tasks from user side. Regardless the 
access network provider or the terminals, users 
would access consistently to their services that 
would be personalized according to their user 
profiles. In such a way, users profiles are no longer 
tied to network identifiers. Users would keep their 
identity as an overlay regardless the access network 
provider. 
• Interoperability: The identity management system 
relies on open standards in order to facilitate the 
interoperability with other systems. Our system uses 
EAP, InfoCards and SAML. The latter is the only 
open standard and is characterized by its high 
flexibility, so compatibility is assured.  
 
• The identity management framework must exchange 
identity information in a seamless, efficient and 
scalable manner.  
 
B. Proposed Architecture 
 
In this section we describe the functional architecture of 
the proposed WiMaX security infrastructure. It is important 
to note that our proposal does not substitute but complements 
existing WiMAX security solutions. As can be seen in 
Figure 2, our system consists of federated entities with the 
following roles: 1) the Network Service Provider (NSP) 
defined in WiMAX, with some identity extensions; 2) the 
Content Provider, which provides different kinds of content 
(e.g. multimedia, voice over IP) that requires different QoSs; 
3) the SAML Identity Provider (IdP), which vouches for the 
identity of a user and supports several authentication 
mechanisms (e.g. InfoCards, user/password, digital 
certificates, EAP-AKA (U-SIM) and 4) the User, which 
interacts with the NSP and the IdP through his devices (using 
an identity selector). SAML messages exchanged among 
entities are encapsulated as EAP payloads and transported 
over Diameter. The idea is to offer security services, multiple 
factor authentication and flexible user profile management, 
which enables to facilitate for instance QoS management and 
service personalization in a robust and flexible manner. 
For the practical realization of this solution we divided 
our system into a series of interconnected software blocks 
that distribute all the functionality in a modular fashion. To 
dive deeply into the details of these modules, we provide an 
individual explanation of each one in the following sections. 
Note that, the SAML Identity Provider (IdP) located in the 
home network operator domain is not part of the WiMAX 
security infrastructure itself since handles user authentication 
and profiles on behalf of any service. Finally, it must be also 
noted that Fig. 2 only sketches out the additional components 
defined in the NSP. 
 
1) Session Management module (SM) is responsible for 
retrieving the user profile, the subscription profile and the 
device profile, as well as, maintaining an adequate session 
context at each moment. Furthermore, this module performs 
tasks related to linking a user profile defined in an InfoCard 
to a session identifier and it may check several profiles in 
order to determine the most appropriate content for a specific 
service (e.g. encoding). Note that the SM can be located at 
the WiMAX Home Network Service Provider or as part of 
an external SAML IdP. In the first case, it communicates 
with the Service Personalization module in order to carry out 
the user profile exchange. Otherwise, if this logical block is 
collocated with the IdP, it is responsible for verifying and 
managing SAML authentication assertions and attribute 
statements issued by the IdP. This module communicates 
with other modules handling authentication and attribute 
exchange services, as well as, the User management module. 
Moreover, this module requests the user profile and the 
device profile to the Identity Provider and matches user’s 
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 identity with the subscription profile policy and any other 
enforced IdP security policy. 
 
 
Fig. 2. Security Architecture for Service Personalization in WiMAX. 
 
2) Personalization Service module (PS) receives the user 
profile from a profile store, which is an extension of the 
3GPP HLR / HSS (extended HSS), thereby enabling its use 
as a standard [23] one or with additional identity 
management capabilities. Moreover, the extended HSS may 
request to increase or modify privileges or perform 
customization according to security policies defined in the 
SAML IdP. Furthermore, this module interacts with the SM 
module for retrieving information from service/user data and 
other services to personalize the WiMAX service. Note that, 
the degree of personalization depends on the information 
disclosed by the user in his profile that will be governed by 
the credential chosen using the identity selector.  
 
3)QoS Management and Filtering:  The QoS 
Management (QoSM) module plays a similar role as the 
Proxy-Call Session Control Function (P-CSCF) entity in 
NGN architectures and is in charge of dealing with quality of 
service features. It extracts the necessary QoS information in 
order to find out an appropriate mapping to WiMAX 
parameters. The IEEE 802.16/WiMAX standard defines a 
QoS framework for different classes of services. The 
following describes the main types of supported services, 
each of which has different QoS requirement: 
 
• Unsolicited grant service (UGS): suitable for traffic 
with very strict QoS constraints for which loss and 
delay need to be minimized (e.g. voice over IP), 
because the UGS service allows BS to allocate a 
fixed amount of bandwidth to each of the 
connections in a static manner, supporting constant-
bit-rate traffic.  
• Polling service (PS): the amount of bandwidth 
required for this type of service is determined 
dynamically based on the required QoS performance 
and the dynamic traffic arrivals for the 
corresponding connections. This service supports 
traffic for which some level of QoS guarantee is 
required (e.g. real time applications).  
• Best Effort Service (BE): the amount of bandwidth 
allocated to BE services depends on the bandwidth 
allocation policies for the other types of services 
seen before. Therefore, this service is suitable for 
traffic with no QoS guarantee (e.g. web, e-mail).  
 
Moreover, the QoSM module sends parameters to the 
WiMAX resource controller, which is the Connectivity 
Service Controller at the ASN. To do this, it has to interact 
with the IdP for performing session establishment or 
modification, authentication and authorization of users, as 
well as, the negotiation of media attributes (e.g. QoS 
parameters). The QoS Management module communicates 
with the Personalization Service module to provide a 
personalized QoS taking into account user preferences, 
subscription profile and security features. 
Finally, the QoS parameters, the user profile, the 
subscription profile, the device profile and the security 
policies can be taken as inputs to compose a secure filter, 
which allows presenting content according to users and 
devices requirements. 
 
4) User Management (UM) module is in charge of 
managing users’ profiles according to their preferences, 
storing credentials and enforcing security policies. It allows 
users to generate their own InfoCard (Personal or Self-
Issued), which can be stored in his device for 
personalization. These information cards can be issued and 
managed by the SAML IdP and they may contain some 
network parameters subject to verification. Note that we 
assume that applications not needing stringent security 
requirements, such as blogs, forums, news services, would 
trust self-issued InfoCards. 
One of the main advantages of using InfoCards is that 
they give users more control over the process of disclosing 
their attributes to services. In addition, attribute information 
obtained from InfoCards, allows the UM module to build or 
complete the user profile. However, apart from infoCards, 
other types of credential (e.g. username/passwords, digital 
certificates, or GBA) can be stored. Thus, the UM module 
enables the IdP to act on behalf of the user and authenticates 
to the different applications providing an easy and seamless 
navigation experience. 
Security policies are defined by a configurable set of 
rules that evaluate conditions based on profile attributes in 
order to deny or grant permissions for a subject to access 
particular services. For instance, different delegation or 
security policies rules can be established depending on, for 
instance, whether the user is on his personal or work 
network. 
Therefore, when the User Management module receive a 
request for fetching a profile (which contains a user 
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 identifier) from the SM module network service provider, if 
the user does not have a valid context session, the request 
would be redirected to the IdP for requesting authentication. 
Then, the user authenticates, selects the attributes to disclose 
in his profile (or a predefined user profile or card) and selects 
the device (or leaves it to the default). Finally, the UM 
module retrieves the corresponding user and device profiles 
and obtains an applicable security policy. 
V. USES CASES 
In this section, we present some potential use cases that 
inspired the proposed infrastructure. These use cases might 
give an idea on how the user experience can be improved 
when he accesses to a wide range of high-quality and high 
capacity IP-based services and multimedia applications 
while maintaining full backwards compatibility with the 
existing WiMAX system: 
1) Personalized content: All the content (social networks, 
multimedia applications) can be displayed according to the 
preferences of the user accessing to the WiMAX network. 
This is achieved through the SAML IdP, which provides 
services for user authentication, user profile management and 
device profile selection. User authentication can be 
performed by either third party credentials such as PKI or 
user/password or IdP (managed infoCard). In addition, a 
device can be explicitly selected by the user or automatically 
selected according to the context and preferences. The user, 
device and subscription profile are associated under a 
WiMAX session linked to a specific user identity and can be 
used for accomplish service and content personalization. 
2) Personalized QoS and service mapping: The quality of 
service can be automatically o explicitly selected by the user 
according to his preferences if it is permitted by the network 
(e.g congestion level, allocated bandwidth). For instance, if 
the user is in a meeting and he must communicate with his 
partners through video conference, he can explicitly request 
a service mapping to the WiMAX UGS to provide a constant 
bandwidth for that traffic. Or, if the user is checking his mail 
at home, BE service class could be mapped automatically. 
3) Profile and network roaming: A user can move his 
profile between different devices, for example exporting his 
Information Cards. Furthermore, our infrastructure allows 
user to change his profile when changing his usual location. 
On the other hand, the proposed IdM framework offers users 
greater control over their privileges allowing to define per-
provider profiles supporting so the nomadicity of users. 
VI. RELATED  WORK 
The IEEE 802.16 standards and WiMAX Forum 
documents centre their security on the device or on a user 
identifier avoiding further personalization. As we have 
discussed, access control, authorization and personalization 
are crucial for a better user experience. Moreover, with the 
advent of complex resource control services, new attack 
opportunities have aroused [24], such as DoS attacks. 
Moreover, service and billing frauds can take place if there 
are third-parties masquerading as legitimate ones. 
Regarding mobility, the IEEE 802.16 security design has 
not yet considered dynamic multi-hop connection between 
mobile Relay Stations (RSs) and BSs. Another important 
aspect that current WiMAX standard does not address well is 
mesh next hop trustworthiness. The additional dimensions of 
RS mobility and multi-hop connection create various 
security vulnerabilities such as IP spoofing. Moreover, mesh 
operation mode and mobility add more complexity to key 
management. Therefore, there are necessary security 
protocols for dynamic networks that address the 
trustworthiness of the next-hop BS/RS. Several works, which 
deal with distributed and dynamic trust relationship in 
wireless and pervasive environments, can be found in the 
literature. In [25] a distributed trust relationship (DTR) 
model for mobile BWA networks is proposed as an 
extension of the IEEE 802.16 security protocol. This 
approach defines a framework, which uses a polinomial-
based key distribution to enhance the establishment of a 
mutual networking trust relationship between any two 
networking entities; as well as, the multi-hop security 
authentication among mobile RSs and BSs. 
Another interesting proposal [26], illustrates a 
decentralized trust management model for pervasive 
computing that could be adapted to operate at network level. 
Eventually, it must be noted that, in WiMAX, security 
threats and vulnerabilities apply to both the physical and the 
MAC access control layers. However, nowadays there are no 
efficient techniques to prevent physical layer attacks, such as 
jamming or scrambling. For that reason, WiMAx security 
focuses mainly on the MAC level [27]. 
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
The proposed identity management infrastructure 
combines the benefits of IdM frameworks as SAML and 
InfoCards to achieve seamless and secure service 
personalization in a WiMAX scenario. As far as the WiMAX 
security features are concerned, in this paper we have 
reviewed its security architecture and have identified some 
weaknesses in regard to user management and digital 
identity management. With the introduction of the SAML 
Identity Provider, we have designed a user-centric 
architecture that allows to deal with authentication, user 
profile and device profile management for better identity 
management in WiMAx networks. It is important to note that 
our proposal does not substitute but complements existing 
WiMAX security solutions, while enabling secure 
personalization of services and improvement of user 
experience. Finally, we have analyzed unsolved challenges 
in WiMAX security, such as DoS attacks, service and billing 
frauds and we have presented some approaches which try to 
address secure mobility issues. 
   As future work, we are focusing on the integration of our 
IdM infrastructure in LTE since currently it is highly 
deployed compared to WiMAX. Moreover, LTE provides 
the necessary building blocks, as EAP-AKA, therefore we 
believe that our proposal could complement LTE 
authentication mechanisms to provide a better user 
experience. Further research could include a deep study on 
LTE security to identifying limitations that can be covered 
6
 with identity management. Finally, we aim to test the 
performance of the proposed identity system. 
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